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Error filtration is a method for encoding the quantum state of a single particle into a higher
dimensional Hilbert space in such a way that it becomes less sensitive to phase noise. We exper-
imentally demonstrate this method by distributing a secret key over an optical fiber whose noise
level otherwise precludes secure quantum key distribution. By filtering out the phase noise, a bit
error rate of 15.3% ± 0.1%, which is beyond the security limit, can be reduced to 10.6% ± 0.1%,
thereby guaranteeing the cryptographic security.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.65.-w
One of the central results in quantum information is
that errors can, in principle, be corrected [1, 2]. This
discovery transformed quantum information from an in-
tellectual game into a field which could revolutionize the
way we process information. Practical realizations of
quantum error correcting codes are, however, extremely
difficult because they require multiparticle interactions.
A first experimental demonstration of quantum error cor-
rection has recently been realized [3], but it is still very
far from being usable in practical applications. An al-
ternative method, called error filtration, allows errors to
be filtered out during quantum communication, and can
in contrast be easily implemented using present technol-
ogy [4]. The main idea of error filtration is to encode
one qubit in a single particle within a Hilbert space of
dimension greater than two. It is then possible to de-
tect, with high probability, whether a phase error has
occurred, and, if so, to discard the state. This quantum
error detection scheme is less powerful than full error
correction, but, for many applications such as quantum
key distribution (QKD), discarding the state affected by
phase noise is sufficient. The advantage of this method
is that the encoding and decoding operations do not re-
quire multiparticle interactions, hence they are relatively
easy to implement by interferometric techniques.
Here, we report on an experimental demonstration of
error filtration. For a detailed theoretical introduction to
the method, we refer to [4] where it is also shown that
error filtration can be extended to the purification of en-
tanglement affected by phase noise. Our experimental
scheme is based on the fiber optics “plug and play” quan-
tum cryptosystem [5, 6] and its extension to more than
two dimensions presented in [7] in the context of quantum
computing. The interest of error filtration is illustrated
by performing QKD over a noisy quantum communica-
tion channel with so much noise that a secure BB84 pro-
tocol cannot be realized. It is known that if the bit error
rate (BER) exceeds 14.6%, then a simple cloning attack
makes the BB84 protocol insecure. On the other hand,
if the BER is lower than 11.0%, then the BB84 proto-
col is provably secure. Between the two boundaries lies
a gray zone where the security of BB84 is unknown, see
[8] for a review. In our experiment, we consider an error
prone QKD scheme with a BER = 15.3% ± 0.1%, which
is therefore insecure. Using error filtration, the BER is
brought down to 10.6% ± 0.1% so that QKD is rendered
secure. Nevertheless, the present work will probably not
have immediate practical applications in QKD because
the main limitation at present is absorption rather than
phase noise. In order to extend QKD much beyond the
present limit of 100 km, new techniques such as quantum
repeaters will have to be used (see [9, 10] for recent pro-
posals). Then, the contribution of phase noise will prob-
ably become significant and error filtration could provide
a simple solution. Finally, note that it was realized pre-
viously that the use of higher dimensional systems can
increase the resistance of QKD to noise [11]. We will dis-
cuss the advantages of error filtration over these previous
methods in what follows.
Our experimental error filtration setup works with at-
tenuated coherent states traveling in localized time bins
in optical fibers (standard SMF-28), see Fig. 1. Bob uses
a laser diode at 1.55 µm to produce a 3-ns light pulse.
The pulse is attenuated by an optical attenuator (Agilent
8156A), and then split by a first 50/50 coupler (C1) to
produce two pulses. These pulses impinge on the input
ports of a polarization beamsplitter (PBS) with a time
delay ∆ = 60 ns. Their polarizations are rotated, using
polarization controllers, so that the two pulses exit by the
same port of the PBS. Next, the two pulses are processed
through an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferom-
eter C2C3 with a path length difference equivalent to
2∆. This produces four emerging pulses traveling down a
900-ns delay line (representing the noisy communication
channel). Then, at Alice’s site, the pulses are reflected
back by a Faraday mirror. The use of a Faraday mirror
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FIG. 1: Fiber optics QKD setup with error filtration.
makes the setup insensitive to birefringence in the de-
lay line. Alice may modify the phases of the four pulses
using a phase modulator (φA) (Trilink) controlled by a
pattern generator (Agilent 81110A). When they reach
Bob’s site, the pulses pass through the MZ interferom-
eter and interfere at the C2 coupler, which, as we shall
show, realizes error filtration. The six emerging pulses
then travel trough Bob’s phase modulator (φB) (Trilink)
and the PBS to the coupler C1, where they interfere and
are sent to a single-photon detector (id Quantique id200)
via a circulator. The detector was gated by a pattern
generator during a 5-ns window around the arrival time
of the central pulse. Its output was registered using a
time-to-digital delay converter (ACAM-GP1) connected
to a computer. All electronic components were triggered
by a pulse generator (Standford Research Inc. DG355).
In order to maximize the interference visibilities, polar-
ization controllers were introduced in the long arm of
the MZ interferometer and in front of the polarization-
sensitive phase modulators. Once optimized, the setup
was stable for days.
Before discussing error filtration, let us first consider
the case where the MZ interferometer C2C3 is absent.
Then our setup is identical to the plug-and-play quantum
cryptography setup [5]. The wavefunction describing the
state after Alice has encoded her phase φA can be written
as 1√
2
(|t0〉H − eiφA |t1〉V ), where the subscripts H and
V represent the polarization states while the subscripts
0 and 1 represent the relative delay of time bin i, i.e.
ti = i · ∆. In the BB84 protocol, the phase φA must
be chosen randomly in {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }. The (−1) phase in
front of |t1〉V takes into account the conventional relative
phase of pi/2 between the reflected and transmitted light
at coupler C1 and at the PBS. The state leaving Alice’s
site thus reads
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|t0〉V − eiφA |t1〉H
]
. (1)
where the polarizations have been interchanged because
of the Faraday mirror.
Intrinsic noise in the plug-and-play QKD scheme is ac-
tually very low, see [6], so that in our experiment we had
to simulate the noisy channel by making Alice’s phase
modulator imperfect. This was achieved by electronically
combining the signal from the pattern generator with the
output of a function generator (Agilent 33250A) produc-
ing gaussian electronic noise with an adjustable ampli-
tude and a 50-MHz 3dB-bandwidth. Since the time bins
are separated by 60 ns, the phase noise in the successive
time bins can be considered as independent. The state
produced by Alice is thus
1√
2
[
eiϕ0 |t0〉V − ei(φA+ϕ1)|t1〉H
]
. (2)
where the ϕi’s are independent random phases drawn
from a gaussian probability distribution P (ϕi) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(−ϕ2i /(2σ2)
)
of tunable variance σ2. The
density matrix obtained by averaging over the random
phases is ρ = e−σ
2 |ψ〉〈ψ|+ (1− e−σ2)1 /2, so that phase
noise amounts to the admixture of isotropic noise. In
terms of bit error rate, this noise level thus corresponds
to BER = 1− 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 = (1− e−σ2)/2.
The two pulses travel back to Bob, who performs a
measurement in the 1√
2
(|t0〉V ∓ e−iφB |t1〉H) basis by ap-
plying the phase φB ∈ {0, pi2 }. Bob’s detector is con-
nected to either output port P1 or P2. The probability
for Bob to detect a count (assuming a perfect detector)
is 12 ± 12 cos(ϕ1 − ϕ0 + φA + φB) where the sign depends
on which output port is used. The visibility of the inter-
ference fringes measured by Bob is
V =
Imax − Imin
Imax + Imin
= e−σ
2
. (3)
The measured values of V agree well with this prediction,
see lower curve in Fig. 2. Note that the visibility is related
to the bit error rate via BER = (1− V )/2.
In order to carry out error filtration, we use the ad-
ditional MZ interferometer C2C3. Each pulse exiting
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FIG. 2: Visibility as a function of the standard deviation of
the noise signal produced by the function generator. The pro-
portionality factor between the x-axis and σ was determined
by fitting the experimental data without filtration with Eq.
(3). The squares (full circles) represent the measured visibil-
ities without (with) filtration, while the curves are the the-
oretical predictions of Eqs. (3) and (8). The open circles
show filtration in the single-photon regime. The inset magni-
fies the data in the region where one passes from an insecure
(V ≤ 70.7%) to a secure (V > 78.0%) QKD protocol. The
criss-crossed area shows that a visibility that is either inse-
cure or of unknown security can be increased to a provably
secure one. By making the statistics over 200,000 runs, the
error bars were made smaller than the plotting points.
from the PBS is split into two pulses by the MZ in-
terferometer according to |t0〉H → (|t0〉H − |t2〉H)/2,
|t1〉V → (|t1〉V − |t3〉V )/2. The factor 1/2 takes into
account that half of the intensity is lost at coupler C3.
After Alice has encoded her phase φA and the pulses have
been reflected by the Faraday mirror, the state becomes
1
2
√
2
[|t0〉V − |t2〉V − eiφA(|t1〉H − |t3〉H)
]
. (4)
This is formally identical to the BB84 protocol since Alice
effectively uses the 2-dimensional space S spanned by
(|t0〉V − |t2〉V ) and (|t1〉H − |t3〉H). The time bins t2 and
t3 are just replica of the time bins t0 and t1, respectively.
Then, because of the noise, the four pulses get random
phases ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3, respectively. The state that
Alice sends back to Bob is thus
1
2
√
2
[
eiϕ0 |t0〉V − eiϕ2 |t2〉V − eiφA(eiϕ1 |t1〉H − eiϕ3 |t3〉H)
]
.
(5)
It now belongs to the full space spanned by |t0〉V , |t1〉V ,
|t3〉H and |t4〉H , since the phase noise has taken it out
of the space S. The idea of error filtration is for Bob
to project the state back onto S in order to selectively
enhance the visibility. This projection is realized by the
MZ interferometer. It succeeds with probability 1/2 in
our implementation because at coupler C3, each pulse
only has a probability 1/2 of taking the right path [12].
When time bins t0 and t1 follow the long path in the MZ
interferometer while time bins t2 and t3 follow the short
path, the time bins t0 and t1 then interfere respectively
with t2 and t3 at coupler C2 and error filtration occurs.
The component of the resulting quantum state into the
time window (t2, t3) is the 2-dimensional state
−1
4
√
2
[
(eiϕ0 + eiϕ2)|t2〉V − eiφA(eiϕ1 + eiϕ3)|t3〉H
]
, (6)
where the normalization takes into account the losses at
the unconnected pigtail at coupler C2. The interference
of phase factors in the amplitudes is responsible for the
error filtration. All other optical paths do not participate
to error filtration, as we can see by considering the full
state entering Bob’s phase modulator
1
4
√
2
[
eiϕ0 |t0〉V − ei(φA+ϕ1)|t1〉H − (eiϕ0 + eiϕ2)|t2〉V
+eiφA(eiϕ1 + eiϕ3)|t3〉H + eiϕ2 |t4〉V − ei(φA+ϕ3)|t5〉H)
]
.(7)
Indeed, the time bins (t0, t1, t4, t5) contain information
about φA, but phase errors are not filtered out since
(t0, t1) and (t4, t5) have the same structure as Eq. (2).
Bob completes his measurement by encoding the phase
φB and letting the time bins interfere at coupler C1. In
the time window (t2, t3), this realizes a measurement in
the 1√
2
(|t2〉V ∓ e−iφB |t3〉H) basis. In fact, there will be
three time bins t′0, t
′
2, and t
′
4 at the output of coupler
C1. Time bin t
′
2 corresponds to the measurement of the
filtered state, Eq. (6), whereas time bins t′0 and t
′
4 cor-
respond to the measurement of the unfiltered time bins
(t0, t1) and (t4, t5), respectively. Assuming that the noise
affecting the different time bins is independent, the visi-
bility of the interference fringes in the time bin t′2 is
V = 2/(1 + eσ
2
). (8)
Thus, filtration effects an increase of visibility at the ex-
pense of a decreased intensity (the information is lost
when the photon ends up in the unused port of C2 or
in the time bins t′0 or t
′
4). The generalization to the
case where Alice uses 2N time bins to encode her qubit
is immediate. One finds that the visibility becomes
V2N = N/(N − 1 + eσ2), see [4].
The measured average visibilities are plotted in Fig. 2
as a function of the phase noise standard deviation in
the case where Alice applies φA = 0 and Bob measures
the output port P1. Without noise, the maximal visibil-
ities exceeded 99%. With unfiltered noise (lower curve),
the visibility decreases exponentially with the amount of
noise in accordance with Eq. (3). The filtration achieved
by our setup (upper curve) is also very close to the theo-
retical prediction of Eq. (8). Visibilities in the range from
65% to 78% are enhanced, by filtration, to the range from
478% to 85%, see inset of Fig. 2. Noting that the secu-
rity threshold BER < 11.0% translates into V > 78.0%
while the insecurity threshold BER ≥ 14.6% corresponds
to V ≤ 70.7%, we conclude that our setup transforms
a BB84 protocol which is insecure (or of unknown se-
curity) into a provably secure one. Note that the visi-
bilities were also tested for the other possible values of
φA = pi/2, pi, 3pi/2 used in the BB84 protocol and for both
ports P1 and P2. The visibilities all exceeded 97.2% in
the case where no noise is added. The lowest visibilities
are associated with the cases where Alice and Bob choose
the {pi2 , 3pi2 } basis since then both parties must apply a
potential to their polarization-sensitive phase modulator
which makes the setup noisier.
In Figure 2, the visibilities were measured in a regime
where the state, when it leaves Alice’s site, contains ap-
proximately 120 photons. In this way, the dark counts
of the detector are negligible. To consider a realistic
QKD implementation, we also ran the experiment in the
single-photon regime, where the quantum state sent by
Alice back to Bob contains approximately 0.8 photons
per pulse. The difficulty in this case is that dark counts
become very important (they give a raw error rate of
about 30%) because we use 3-ns pulses [13]. Neverthe-
less, we were able to show in this regime that a visibility
of 69.4% ±0.2% in the absence of filtration can be turned
into 78.8% ±0.2% by filtration, where the statistical er-
ror was calculated for a 95% confidence level, see open
circles in Fig. 2. These visibilities are averaged over all
four choices of φA and for the two output ports P1 and
P2, so they are the relevant quantities for characterizing
a QKD scheme. This averaging explains why these points
lie slightly off the curves in Fig. 2. Note that in QKD
the errors due to the dark counts can in principle be re-
moved using error correction codes without altering the
security, although in practice this is probably impossible
for the high level of dark counts we have here.
We conclude by comparing this method with other
QKD schemes that use higher dimensional systems [11].
The noise model in both cases is the same: a d-
dimensional state |ψ〉 entering the communication chan-
nel exits as ρ = e−σ
2 |ψ〉〈ψ|+ (1− e−σ2)1 /d. This makes
the comparison meaningful. The QKD schemes based on
sets of mutually unbiased bases considered in [11] can
only tolerate a noise level up to e−σ
2
< 1/2. This is be-
cause when e−σ
2
= 1/2, there is a simple attack in which
the eavesdropper (Eve) does not modify the state with
probability 1/2, while, with probability 1/2, she keeps
the state and sends a random one instead. In contrast,
error filtration can tolerate arbitrarily high levels of noise
if the dimensionality d of the Hilbert space is sufficiently
large since the visibility Vd tends to 1 for large d and
fixed e−σ
2
. The reason why the above attack no longer
works in the case of error filtration is that when Eve re-
places the quantum state by a random one, the filtration
preferentially removes the corresponding noisy term. In
other words, the noise is replaced by a higher effective
loss. Nevertheless, this also means that a QKD scheme
using error filtration can be vulnerable to attacks which
exploit loss. For instance, if Alice sends attenuated co-
herent states, Eve could use a photon-number splitting
attack, see [8] and references therein. In fact, our setup
would probably be insecure against such attacks since we
used attenuated coherent states with 0.8 photons on av-
erage and were very close to the limit of provably secure
QKD. This is not a fundamental problem and could be
remedied by further attenuating the states or by using
better approximations of single-photon sources.
In summary, the present experiment demonstrates the
optical part of a quantum key distribution scheme which
can operate with a phase-noise level that is too high for a
standard implementation of the BB84 to be secure. This
demonstrates the power and simplicity of error filtration
as a practical method for circumventing phase noise in
quantum communication.
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